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From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year
for American firms. The probability of large decreases in ownership is strongly increasing in contemporaneous
and past stock returns but the probability of large increases in ownership through managerial purchases
of shares is not. The relation between changes in Tobin's q and past and contemporaneous changes
in ownership depends critically on controlling for past stock returns. When controlling for past stock
returns, past large decreases in managerial ownership are unrelated to current changes in Tobin's q
but there is some evidence that past large increases in managerial ownership are positively related
to current changes in Tobin's q. Because managers sell shares when a firm's stock is performing well,
large contemporaneous decreases in managerial ownership are associated with increases in Tobin's
q. We argue that our evidence is mostly inconsistent with existing theories and propose a managerial
discretion theory of ownership consistent with our evidence.
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We examine the dynamics of managerial ownership for American firms from 1988 through 
2003. We find that the average and median annual change in managerial ownership during that 
period is negative. In others words, a firm’s managerial ownership is expected to decline. Further, 
we show that a firm that experiences an economically significant change in ownership is 
substantially more likely to experience a decline in ownership than an increase. High past and 
concurrent stock returns make it significantly more likely that a firm will experience an 
economically significant decrease in managerial ownership. In contrast, there is little evidence 
that low past and concurrent stock returns increase the probability of large increases in 
managerial ownership.   
We investigate how changes in managerial ownership are related to changes in Tobin’s q, 
taking into account the relation between managerial ownership and stock returns. We find no 
evidence that decreases in managerial ownership are associated with decreases in Tobin’s q. In 
sharp contrast to the literature that examines the relation between managerial ownership and firm 
value in the cross section, we show that decreases in managerial ownership are associated with 
contemporaneous increases in Tobin’s q. Further, there is some evidence that past and 
contemporaneous increases in managerial ownership are correlated with increases in Tobin’s q, 
so that the contemporaneous relation between changes in Tobin’s q and managerial ownership is 
u-shaped. Our findings are difficult to reconcile with existing theories of managerial ownership 
and with existing interpretations of the evidence on the firm value/managerial ownership relation. 
We argue that a new theory of managerial ownership which emphasizes managerial discretion 
and the firm’s lifecycle is required to explain our findings.  
There is a considerable literature devoted to understanding the impact of managerial 
ownership on firm value. Much of that research draws its inspiration from the agency literature 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and Stulz (1988)). In that 
literature, greater managerial ownership benefits shareholders because it increases managers’ 
incentives to increase firm value, but when managerial ownership becomes too large, it enables   3
managers to entrench themselves, so that firm value falls as managerial ownership increases. 
Because of these countervailing forces, the relation between firm value and managerial ownership 
is not monotonic. We call this view the agency approach to managerial ownership. 
Following Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), many authors argue that 
managerial ownership is endogenously determined. This view has led to an alternative approach, 
which we call the contracting theory approach to managerial ownership. The contracting 
approach posits that firms have an optimal level of managerial ownership that solves a principal-
agent problem. Shareholders set the terms of a compensation contract for management which 
includes management’s ownership in the firm. If actual managerial ownership is the solution to a 
contracting problem between management and shareholders and there are no adjustment costs, 
firm value would always be maximized given the constraints faced by shareholders. Hence, 
everything else constant, firm value could not be increased by changing managerial ownership.  
There is considerable controversy as to which view is more appropriate. Recent papers 
attempting to differentiate between the two views use fixed-effect models and instrumental 
variables to address the problems created by the endogeneity of managerial ownership. Both 
approaches have been shown to have serious limitations. Zhou (2001) shows that the fixed effects 
approach has limited power because most changes in managerial ownership are small. Coles, 
Lemmon, and Meschke (2006) provide examples of instrumental variable estimations in a fully 
specified structural model in which the instrumental variable approach finds a relation between q 
and managerial ownership when the structural model does not have such a relation. Though one 
influential paper (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999)) suggests that focusing on ownership 
changes would be useful to understand the relation between Tobin’s q and ownership, the 
dynamics of managerial ownership and their relation to changes in Tobin’s q have been neglected   4
in the recent literature.
1 Yet, considering separately the relation between changes in Tobin’s q and 
past and contemporaneous economically significant changes in managerial ownership in a firm-
fixed effects regression approach helps address the criticisms leveled at earlier approaches. Coles, 
Lemmon, and Meschke (2006) demonstrate that the firm-fixed effects approach has the potential 
to address endogeneity caused by unobservable firm characteristics, but caution that the lack of 
time variation in the level of ownership is an impediment to this approach. Because we focus on 
economically significant changes in managerial ownership, we eliminate the issues raised by 
Zhou (2001) in his criticism of the firm-fixed effects regression approach. Further, since we 
consider the relation between changes in Tobin’s q and past changes in ownership within a firm, 
there is less ground to be concerned about the endogeneity issue that has befuddled much of the 
empirical work. A further advantage of looking at the relation between firm value and managerial 
ownership dynamically is that it is possible to decompose changes in managerial ownership into 
changes caused by purchases and sales of shares by managers and changes caused by increases or 
decreases in shares outstanding.  
If economically significant decreases in ownership cause decreases in Tobin’s q, we should 
see a positive relation between changes in Tobin’s q and past or contemporaneous changes in 
ownership. We find no such relation for decreases in managerial ownership when we control for 
past stock performance, but we find such a relation for increases in managerial ownership. We 
show that it is important to control for past stock performance because it is an important 
determinant of ownership decreases.  
Our findings can be explained by an alternative managerial ownership theory, which we call 
the managerial discretion theory of inside ownership. This theory emphasizes that managers own 
shares to maximize their welfare subject to constraints and that firms start their life with highly 
concentrated ownership (see Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) for evidence). The highly 
                                                 
1 An important exception is McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2006). They investigate the contemporaneous 
stock-price reaction to the announcement of insider purchases. We discuss their results in more detail in 
Section 6.   5
concentrated ownership of young firms is partly explained by the fact that early in the life of the 
firm managerial ownership is a cheap form of financing. Later in the life of the firm, managers 
would rather diversify their wealth and reduce their ownership, but they have to take into account 
the impact of their sales on the value of their stake and on their ability to control the firm. First, 
the market for the firm’s stock may not be sufficiently liquid for managers to be able to sell their 
shares without affecting adversely the share price, so that they may be better off to wait. Second, 
the market can infer from managerial sales that management has adverse information and that its 
interests might become less well-aligned with those of shareholders, so that sales may affect 
adversely the value of the shares held by management. Third, as management holds fewer shares, 
its ability to control the firm falls. Hence, we expect managers to sell shares when the market for 
the firm’s shares is liquid enough and receptive enough to an increased supply of shares so that 
the managerial sales do not have a substantial adverse impact on the share price. In addition, we 
expect managerial sales when managers are not concerned that they will face competition in 
controlling the firm. These considerations imply that management will sell when the firm has 
performed well. The reasons that lead management to buy shares are more complex. It is costly 
for management to increase its stake in the firm and there is no reason to expect that it pays for 
management to do so whenever a firm performs poorly – unless one believes that the stock 
market typically overreacts. However, management may increase its stake to help finance the 
firm directly or indirectly by signaling its belief in the firm. Further, if management’s control is 
threatened, it may choose to buy shares to strengthen its control of the firm. Our evidence is 
consistent with these predictions.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we review the literature and elaborate on our 
theory of managerial ownership. The construction of our database is described in Section 2. In 
Section 3, we document the decrease in managerial ownership and describe more generally how 
managerial ownership evolves over our sample period 1988–2003. We then investigate in Section 
4 why managerial ownership falls on average, focusing on economically significant changes in   6
ownership. The contemporaneous and lagged relation between firm value and managerial 
ownership is analyzed in Section 5. In Section 6, we examine the contemporaneous relation 
between changes in ownership and changes in Tobin’s q. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
Section 1. Managerial ownership and firm value 
 
In this section, we review theories of the determinants of managerial ownership and their 
implications for the relation between firm value and managerial ownership. We consider three 
theories: the agency theory, the contracting theory, and the managerial discretion theory.  
 
A.  The agency theory approach 
The agency theory takes managerial ownership as given. It then derives implications for firm 
value from the level of managerial ownership. Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), greater 
managerial ownership aligns the interests of management better with the interests of shareholders. 
However, with this view, managers’ interests can be aligned with the interests of shareholders 
without managers actually owning shares – all that is required is that managers’ wealth increases 
when the share price increases. When managers hold shares, they also control votes. As managers 
control more votes, they become more entrenched and can use their position to further their 
interests even when doing so does not benefit shareholders (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) and Stulz (1988)). Consequently, too much ownership can adversely affect firm value, 
perhaps because it makes it difficult or even impossible for outsiders to take the firm over. For 
low levels of ownership, the interest alignment benefit of managerial ownership dominates the 
costs associated with entrenchment because at low levels of ownership managers’ ownership does 
not entrench them. However, there is a level of ownership beyond which the entrenchment effect 
dominates, so that increases in managerial ownership beyond that level do not increase firm 
value. At some even higher level of ownership, management is completely entrenched so that   7
further increases in ownership may increase firm value because they only have an incentive 
effect.  
To summarize, the agency theory does not offer predictions about the determinants of 
ownership structure: it is assumed to be exogenous. However, the agency theory implies that 
there is a relation between changes in ownership and changes in Tobin’s q. If the relation between 
firm value and ownership is concave, a decrease in managerial ownership brings about an 
increase in Tobin’s q if managerial ownership is greater than the optimal amount. If the relation 
between firm value and ownership is curvilinear with two segments with positive slope, increases 
in managerial ownership increase firm value for both low and high levels of ownership but 
decrease firm value for intermediate levels of ownership.  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine a large sample of firms with ownership data 
from the Value Line Investment Survey and find a curvilinear relation between managerial 
ownership and Tobin‘s q. In their cross-sectional regressions for both 1976 and 1986, Tobin’s q 
increases with ownership up to 50% (1976) and 40% (1986), respectively, and decreases for 
larger ownership levels. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) estimate a piecewise linear 
regression of Tobin’s q on insider ownership, which they define as ownership by the company’s 
directors. In their sample of 460 large firms in 1980 provided by the Corporate Data Exchange, 
they find that Tobin’s q significantly increases for director ownership levels between zero and 
five percent, decreases between 5 and 25 percent, and again increases for levels of ownership 
above 25 percent. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also estimate a piecewise linear regression of 
Tobin’s Q on managerial ownership, which is measured by the ownership of the current CEO and 
of directors who are former CEOs. They find a positive relation between Q and ownership for 
ownership levels between 0 and 1 percent and between 5 and 20 percent, and a negative relation 
for ownership levels between 1 and 5 percent and above 20 percent. 
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) use data on large firms for 1935 and 1995 to 
re-estimate the Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) regression. They find support for the saw-  8
toothed relationship in the 1935 sample, but not in the 1995 sample. More recently, McConnell, 
Servaes, and Lins (2006) find a curvilinear relationship between announcement returns of insider 
purchases and the level of insider ownership.  
 
B.  The contracting theory approach 
The evidence of a positive relation between firm value and managerial ownership is 
interpreted by proponents of the agency theory as evidence that higher managerial ownership 
increases shareholder wealth because it aligns the interests of management better with the 
interests of shareholders as long as managerial ownership is not so high that it becomes a vehicle 
for managerial entrenchment. Managers choose their ownership in the firm and they ought to be 
encouraged to choose an even higher ownership. The problem with the agency theory approach is 
that it is not clear why managers hold shares in the first place and why they would choose to hold 
more shares. If there is a cost to managers of holding shares, they would hold more shares only if 
they are compensated for doing so. Since shareholders would have to compensate managers for 
holding shares, on net, shareholders might be worse off even if an increase in managerial 
ownership increases the incentives of managers to maximize shareholder wealth. The contracting 
approach, which builds on principal-agent models such as Holmstrom (1979), attempts to take 
these costs explicitly into account.  
Consider a firm owned by atomistic shareholders. The shareholders have somehow managed 
to resolve their collective action problem, so that they can act as a group. They have to hire 
managers and set incentives for these managers so that firm value will be maximized. In this 
situation, the shareholders have to solve an optimization problem where the terms of the 
managers’ contract have to be such that the managers’ participation constraint is met. The 
shareholders’ problem is made more difficult by the fact that, typically, they cannot observe all of 
the managers’ actions. This hidden action problem makes it possible for managers to pursue their 
own objectives at the expense of shareholders. For instance, managers could choose to shirk   9
because shareholders might not be able to find it out. Once managers are in place, shareholders 
face the additional problem that managers have information they do not have. 
Because managers have better information than shareholders and because shareholders 
cannot always establish whether actions undertaken by managers maximize firm value, the 
contracting approach generally reaches the conclusion that the optimal contract for managers 
involves compensation that is sensitive to changes in firm value. This sensitivity of compensation 
to changes in firm value can be achieved without management owning any shares – management 
could simply receive the change in value on phantom shares, for instance, if the optimal contract 
is linear in the share price. However, it is common to interpret the optimal solution as involving 
ownership of shares. As a result, firm value is maximized when managers have an optimal stake 
in the firm’s cash flows, or an optimal level of managerial ownership. Contracting models differ a 
great deal in their complexity and in the issues they emphasize.  
With the contracting view, shareholders face a tradeoff. As the managers’ stake in the firm 
increases, their incentives become better aligned with those of shareholders in that, if they 
increase firm value by one dollar, their wealth increases by a greater fraction of that dollar. 
However, when managers have a large stake in the firm, they are exposed to the risk of the firm. 
Everything else equal, managers would rather hold a diversified portfolio. Consequently, for 
managers to be willing to hold a large stake in the firm, their compensation has to be higher. It 
follows that shareholders benefit from an increase in managerial ownership because of better 
alignment of incentives but incur additional costs because they have to pay managers more.  
If all managers have the same risk aversion and the same wealth, their ownership in the firm 
they manage will depend on the extent of agency problems in the firm and on the risk to 
managers of investing in the firm. As agency problems worsen, managerial ownership increases. 
We would expect agency problems to be more important for firms with more information 
asymmetries. Consequently, everything else equal, managerial ownership should be higher for 
younger firms, firms with more intangible assets, with more R&D investment, and with more   10
capital expenditures. The prediction of the model with respect to stock return volatility is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, greater stock return volatility imposes costs on managers by forcing 
them to bear more risk for a given level of ownership; on the other hand, greater stock return 
volatility may be associated with greater moral hazard since it indicates greater information 
asymmetries and hence greater opportunities for management to take actions that do not benefit 
shareholders. Finally, it is not clear how stock returns affect managerial ownership in the 
contracting model. Keeping everything else unchanged, an increase in the stock price means that 
managers are less diversified since the value of their holdings in the firm increases. This effect 
would predict a decrease in managerial ownership. However, if the firm’s stock price increases 
because the firm has more growth opportunities (but larger information asymmetries), one would 
expect optimal managerial ownership to increase.  
With the contracting view, assuming that the optimal contract with management has been 
selected and that circumstances have not changed, it would be impossible to increase firm value 
by changing managerial ownership. Requiring managers to hold more shares would decrease 
shareholder wealth because the increase in expected compensation needed to satisfy the 
managers’ participation constraint would cost more than the gain from greater incentive 
alignment. Alternatively, requiring managers to hold fewer shares would have a cost through its 
adverse impact on incentive alignment that is greater than the benefit of reduced expected 
managerial compensation.  
Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) find 
support for the predictions of the contracting model of managerial ownership. Variables proxying 
for asymmetric information are positively and significantly related to the level of inside 
ownership. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) further point out that unobservable firm 
characteristics, as captured by firm fixed effects, explain a considerable amount of variation in 
managerial ownership. A concave or curvilinear relation between Tobin’s q and managerial 
ownership is not inconsistent with the contracting model of managerial ownership. Himmelberg,   11
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) show that the contracting model predicts a positive relation between 
Tobin’s q and managerial ownership if firms with more intangible assets have a higher Tobin’s q 
and optimally also have higher managerial ownership. However, it is not the case that the higher 
managerial ownership causes the higher Tobin’s q. Rather, firm characteristics that lead to the 
higher Tobin’s q also lead to higher managerial ownership, so that both the high Tobin’s q and 
the high managerial ownership are the consequences of firm fundamentals. Coles, Lemmon, and 
Meschke (2006) present a model which has these implications. They show through simulations 
that their model can replicate a concave cross-sectional relation between managerial ownership 
and Tobin’s q. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) find support for their view by using firm 
fixed-effects in a regression of Tobin’s q on managerial ownership. In that regression, they find 
no relation between Tobin’s q and managerial ownership. Zhou (2001) shows, however, that the 
power of their approach is questionable because most changes in ownership are small and large 
changes are infrequent in the relatively homogeneous set of firms Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1999) study.  
  
C.  The managerial discretion approach 
With the managerial discretion approach, managers make their decisions subject to 
constraints imposed by shareholders. If shareholders solve their collective action problem in such 
a way that they behave as a group and choose the optimal compensation contract for managers, 
there is no difference between the managerial discretion approach and the contracting approach. 
For the two approaches to be meaningfully different, we follow the existing managerial discretion 
models (for early models, see Stulz (1990), and Zwiebel (1996)) and assume that shareholders 
cannot solve the collective action problem to devise an optimal contract for managers. Instead, 
shareholders can vote with their feet and the stock price reflects the actions the market anticipates 
managers to take. Further, the company can be the subject of a tender offer, so that managers may   12
lose their position. Finally, managers may also lose their position if the firm performs poorly and 
defaults on debt or requires help from banks to avoid default.   
With the managerial discretion approach, managers choose their ownership stake to 
maximize their welfare. This makes ownership endogenous.  The crucial difference between the 
contracting approach and the managerial discretion approach is that the contracting approach 
typically takes a narrow view of private benefits from control, focusing on the effort decision of 
managers, and ignoring financing constraints. In contrast, we assume that managers are able to 
extract a fraction of the firm’s cash flows for their own benefit, but at a cost. Their welfare 
increases as cash flows increase – i.e., as the firm performs well – because a given fraction of 
cash flows is worth more to them. Acquiring a stake in the firm that they manage is therefore 
valuable for managers if the acquisition of that stake increases the resources available to the firm, 
lowers its cost of funding, allows it to grow, and allows them to preserve their control over the 
firm. When the firm is financially constrained or its investors face serious information 
asymmetries, managers may be the cheapest providers of funds to the firm. If shares are issued in 
exchange of cash or services from managers, the acquisition of the managers’ stake or the 
increase of that stake infuses additional resources into the firm. To the extent that the acquisition 
of a stake leads outsiders to infer that the firm is valuable in the eyes of managers, it increases the 
value of the firm and hence makes it easier for managers to raise funds. Finally, the acquisition of 
a stake increases managers’ power in the firm through their ownership of votes.  
The cost to managers of acquiring a stake in the firm they manage is that it forces them to 
bear more of the firm’s risk and limits their ability to make other investments. Managerial 
ownership will therefore not be high when the firm can finance itself at low cost in the capital 
markets, when managers do not expect to be threatened in their position, and when the market 
value of the firm reflects or exceeds managers’ assessment of firm value. Consequently, as a firm 
becomes better established, management will gradually decrease its stake because sales of shares 
by management have little impact on the firm’s stock price. The firm’s equity is traded in a liquid   13
market and external monitoring reduces information asymmetries and limits discretion of 
management. 
With the managerial discretion approach, we would expect managerial ownership to be high 
for firms which are constrained from accessing external finance, which have significant 
information asymmetries, and which have a market for their equity that lacks liquidity. In 
contrast, we expect managerial ownership to be low for well-established firms. We would expect 
increases in managerial ownership for firms that become financially constrained or are subject to 
potential or actual threats from the market for corporate control. Everything else equal, we would 
expect managerial ownership to fall as a firm becomes older and better established.  
The managerial discretion approach also leads to a positive relation between Tobin’s q and 
managerial ownership over some range of ownership levels, but it is somewhat more tentative. 
With this view, young firms have high q’s because they are rich in investment opportunities. As 
young firms tend to have limited access to equity markets, their managerial ownership is high. As 
firms exploit their investment opportunities, their q falls. If they are successful, their managerial 
ownership also falls because the market for their shares becomes more liquid and because 
information asymmetries fall. With the managerial discretion approach, we would not expect a 
causal relation from decreases in managerial ownership to decreases in q. Rather, ownership 
changes would be largely driven by changes in a firm’s circumstances as long as the managers 
stay the same. As managers change, ownership would change because the new managers might 
value private benefits differently or might have a different level of wealth. Changes in a firm’s 
circumstances will also lead insiders to buy shares when doing so is beneficial to them. They may 
do so when a contest for control becomes more likely, when they want to decrease the firm’s cost 
of capital, and when they are the cheapest source of financing for the firm. It is possible for all 
these motives for managerial ownership increases to lead to increases in the share price and to an 
increase in Tobin’s q. The managerial discretion approach also implies that managerial ownership 
is at least partly path-dependent. If management has a high ownership at some time, its ability to   14
reduce that ownership if it wants to depends on the liquidity of the stock. The same firm might 
have a different level of ownership if its management had lower ownership in the past.  
Finally, it is important to note that the managerial discretion theory of ownership recognizes 
two aspects of managerial ownership which are completely ignored by the contracting approach 
and partly ignored by the agency approach. First, it takes into account that managerial ownership 
affects the ability of management to consume private benefits. Second, it explicitly allows for the 
financing role of managerial ownership.  
With the managerial discretion theory of ownership, managerial ownership is endogenous. 
However, whereas the contracting theory of managerial ownership is really a theory of the 
pay/performance sensitivity, the managerial discretion theory of ownership recognizes that 
managers play a complex role in firms that includes, at times, a financing role, and that they may 
use their ownership to preserve private benefits rather than to maximize shareholder wealth. The 
two theories have different implications for the determinants of managerial ownership. With the 
contracting theory, we would expect that a change in a firm characteristic which makes it more 
likely that management will sell shares makes it equally less likely that management will buy 
shares. Such a symmetrical relation is unlikely to hold with the managerial discretion theory 
because management is looking to reduce its stake in the firm when that stake is large because 
management helped finance the firm through share acquisition. With the contracting theory, 
management’s sales of shares always maximize firm value so that management does not have to 
be concerned about a possible negative impact of its sales on firm value. In contrast, with the 
managerial discretion theory, management sells shares when doing so has little adverse impact on 
the share price. Management therefore sells when the market for the firm’s shares is receptive to 
sales of shares by management.    
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Section 2. Data  
We obtain data on insider ownership from Compact Disclosure, which is a CD-Rom 
produced each month. Compact Disclosure attempts to provide information on all firms that file 
with the SEC and have assets in excess of $5 million. Our main variable of interest is the 
aggregate percentage ownership of equity securities by all directors and officers of a company.
2 
Our ownership variable is therefore the same as the one used in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1999), Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007), or Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999).
3 
Compact Disclosure contains text versions of SEC filings and has the ability to create 
summary reports of many variables. We download the total number of shares held by officers and 
directors from all monthly Compact Disclosure CDs that we have access to, and update this 
number whenever the proxy date in Compact Disclosure changes from one year to the next. We 
use CDs from January 1988 to August 2005. Three dates are important in the calculation of the 
fraction of shares held by insiders, the fiscal year end date, the record date, and the proxy date. A 
typical company in our database has a fiscal year end of December 31
st, a record date of February 
28
th, and a proxy date of April 30
th. The annual report, which is sent to investors about a month 
prior to the proxy date, typically lists the number of shares held by officers and directors as of the 
record date. Compact Disclosure reports the number of shares outstanding, but the latter is often 
the fiscal-year end data. If, e.g., a stock split or an equity issue occurs between the fiscal year end 
date and record date, we would calculate the wrong percentage ownership. We therefore use the 
number of shares outstanding from CRSP for the month prior to the proxy date.  
                                                 
2 The laws regulating a company’s proxy disclosure requirements of beneficial ownership of officers and 
directors to shareholders are detailed in Regulation 14A (“Solicitation of Proxies”) and Schedule 14A of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§240.14a). Pursuant to Schedule 14A(6-d) with reference to Item 403 
of Regulation S-K (§229.403) entitled “Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and 
Management,” a company is required to disclose any ownership of equity securities by all directors and 
officers of the company. 
3 Note that the early literature on the interaction of Tobin’s q and ownership sometimes uses slightly 
different definitions. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) study the ownership by the 
company’s directors, and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study the ownership by the five (or twenty) largest 
shareholders of a corporation.   16
  Researchers have compared inside ownership data from Compact Disclosure to 
ownership data from other data sources as well as from proxies. They have found that Compact 
Disclosure is a high quality data source for single class firms, but that there are considerable 
errors in voting ownership for dual class firms (e.g., Anderson and Lee (1997)). Further, 
differences between cash flow rights and voting rights complicate the analysis substantially. We 
therefore exclude dual class firms from our sample.  
  Denis and Sarin (1999) find that large ownership changes are correlated with concurrent 
turnover of key executives. We identify changes in the position of CEO and chairman of the 
board for each firm-year observation. The data on officers and directors is derived from the 
director and officer text lists also provided by Compact Disclosure.
4 
  We match the Compact Disclosure data to CRSP and Compustat using 6-digit cusips. We 
require that a firm is present in at least two adjacent years to calculate the change in insider 
ownership. This leaves us with approximately 44,000 single-class firm-year observations. We 
remove approximately 10,000 firm-years because firms are regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-
4949) or belong to the financial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999). We lose about 6,000 observations 
for which we cannot calculate Tobin’s q due to missing data in Compustat and CRSP. In the 
specifications where we condition on a concurrent change in CEO or chairman, we lose an 
additional 6,000 firm-years, because Compact Disclosure does not report data for all firm-year 





                                                 
4 The director and officer lists contain spelling mistakes and inconsistencies across sample observations. 
We use a sequence of automated programs to standardize names and match directors and officers across 
years in the Compact Disclosure database so that we can identify changes in the CEO and chairman 
position.   17
Section 3. Managerial ownership in U.S. firms: Time-series evidence 
Table 1 shows time-series summary statistics of our ownership data. The data is grouped by 
fiscal year. Our dataset has more than 1,500 firms every year except for the first three years. The 
number of firms peaks in 1999 and falls afterwards.  
The next two columns in Table 1 show the mean and median managerial ownership for our 
sample years. Both the average and the median fluctuate over time, but there is no clear evidence 
of a time trend. It is well-known that smaller and younger firms have higher managerial 
ownership, so that we would expect the average and median managerial ownership to be affected 
by entrants and exits.  
In their well-known study of corporate ownership, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1999) consider firms to be widely held when the controlling shareholder holds less than 20% of a 
firm’s votes according to one metric and less than 10% according to the other metric. Here, we 
have data on ownership of cash flow rights by directors and officers. We see that, on average, 
more than 40% of the firms in our sample would not be widely held according to a 20% 
threshold.
5 The fraction of firms with more than 20% managerial ownership stays relatively 
constant over time. We also see that in a typical year managers have majority control in more 
than 10% of the firms.  
The managerial discretion model predicts that managerial ownership falls as a firm ages, 
everything else equal. The evidence of Table 1 is supportive of this prediction. For existing firms 
inside ownership decreases each year by 0.9% on average. The average decrease in ownership is 
statistically significant at the 10% level in all 16 sample years and statistically significant at better 
than the 1% level in 13 out of 16 years. The median change is negative, but smaller in absolute 
value. Though the median is positive in some years, the overall median is significantly negative at 
the 1% level. The difference between the average and the median is not surprising. A large 
                                                 
5 Because we use ownership by directors and officers, we may overstate the number of widely held firms. 
For instance, institutional investors could own large blocks without having board representation.    18
number of changes in managerial ownership are extremely small and are not economically 
meaningful. This fact is emphasized by Zhou (2001) who points out that managerial ownership is 
typically slow-moving. The median is dominated by such small changes, while the mean is not.  
Another perspective on ownership changes can be obtained by considering separately positive 
changes versus negative changes. It is immediately apparent that every year the mean of negative 
changes is about 50% higher in absolute value than the mean of positive changes. Consequently, 
decreases in ownership tend to be on average substantially larger than increases. 
To focus on economically meaningful changes, we investigate changes of ownership larger 
than 2.5% in absolute value. On average, about a third of firms experience such large changes in a 
year.  A firm is much more likely to experience a large drop than a large increase. The probability 
of a large decrease (21.2%) is almost twice the probability of a large increase (12.4%). This result 
is striking because, in our sample, all firms can experience a large increase but some firms cannot 
experience a large decrease because their managerial ownership is already below 2.5%.  
Changes in ownership in excess of 2.5% in absolute value explain most of the variation in 
changes in managerial ownership. In Table 2, we establish that the change in ownership is 
primarily caused by large changes in ownership. We estimate the following regression for each 
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The R-squared of the regressions in Table 2 exceeds 98% each year. Therefore, the change in 
managerial ownership is mostly determined by large changes, and we focus the analysis of the 
determinants of managerial ownership on the large changes in ownership. We acknowledge that 
the 2.5% cut-off is arbitrary. We have repeated our analysis by defining a large change as a 1%, 
4%, and 5% change, with quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. 
 
   19
Section 4. The determinants of large changes in ownership 
The contracting and managerial discretion approaches discussed in Section 2 make 
predictions about the determinants of changes in managerial ownership. In this Section, we 
investigate the determinants of changes in ownership in excess of 2.5%. We estimate probit 
regressions for large increases and large decreases in ownership. Table 3 describes the data we 
use for this investigation. The sample includes 6,015 large decreases, 3,488 large increases, and 
18,609 observations with no large changes. Interestingly, both firms experiencing large increases 
and large decreases have significantly higher ownership than firms experiencing no large 
changes. Firms experiencing large decreases have significantly higher ownership before the 
decrease than firms with large increases, but after the change they have significantly lower 
ownership than the firms that experienced a large increase. 
Firm characteristics differ significantly among the three groups of firms. However, because 
of the large number of observations, relatively small differences in firm characteristics are 
significant. As we discuss in Section 2, firms with greater information asymmetries should have 
higher ownership according to the contracting theory. Strikingly, firms that experience large 
decreases in ownership appear to be firms with greater information asymmetries if one believes 
that firms with greater information asymmetries are firms with more R&D expenditures, with 
more capital expenditures, with a lower ratio of PPE/Assets, and with no dividends. The 
univariate statistics are therefore largely inconsistent with the contracting theory. Firms which 
experience large drops in ownership have the highest average Tobin’s q. Such a result is puzzling 
given the predictions of both the agency and contracting theories. 
The result that firms which experience a large drop in ownership have a high Tobin’s q is 
consistent with existing literature. For instance, Jenter (2005) provides evidence that managers 
sell when firms have done well and ascribes a timing motive to managers. Even though the timing 
motive does not provide a theory of the level of managerial ownership, it does offer predictions   20
for the dynamics of ownership. With the timing motive, we would expect firms to perform poorly 
following managerial sales. Jenter (2005) does not find evidence supportive of this prediction.   
We also investigate whether firms experience changes in CEO or in the chairman of the board 
that could be associated with large changes in ownership (e.g, Denis and Sarin (1999)). For 
instance, a retiring CEO who has a large ownership stake could sell shares upon retirement. There 
is evidence that firms experiencing a large drop are more likely to have a concurrent change in 
CEO or in the chairman of the board. Such a result is not consistent with simple contracting 
theories in which managerial ownership is determined by firm fundamentals only.  
In the last panel, we summarize the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) variables 
we use. There are extremely large differences in stock performance between the three groups of 
firms. Firms experiencing large drops in ownership are extremely good performers in the year of 
the drop and the year before. In contrast, firms experiencing large increases are poor performers. 
We also see that NASDAQ firms experiencing large decreases in ownership have high turnover 
compared to the other firms, but this is not the case for NYSE firms. Differences in idiosyncratic 
volatility between the three groups of firms do not seem to be economically meaningful. Firms 
that experience large changes are younger and the firms that experience large decreases are the 
youngest. 
To better understand which type of firms experience large changes, we estimate multiple 
probit regressions in Table 4. Strikingly, high managerial ownership is a good predictor of a large 
drop in managerial ownership. This is consistent with the prediction of the managerial discretion 
theory that firms start with high managerial ownership and that managers want to reduce their 
ownership. With that theory, a high level of managerial ownership is typically not a steady-state 
level of managerial ownership.  
Older, larger dividend-paying firms are less likely to experience a large drop in ownership. 
Concurrent changes in the CEO or in the chairman of the board make it more likely that a firm 
will experience a large drop in managerial ownership. Such a result is hard to explain with   21
contracting models in which managerial ownership depends only on firm characteristics. It is 
consistent with the managerial discretion model because in that model ownership depends on the 
preferences and wealth of the management.   
Firms are more likely to experience large drops in ownership if they have more R&D, a 
smaller ratio of PPE to assets, and smaller idiosyncratic volatility. Though the idiosyncratic 
volatility result could be reconciled with the contracting approach, the other two results are 
inconsistent with the predictions of that approach. Finally, firms are more likely to experience a 
large drop if they have high share turnover and high contemporaneous and lagged stock return 
performance. These results are again consistent with the managerial discretion approach.  
When we turn to the firms that experience a large increase, we see that firms with high levels 
of managerial ownership are less likely to experience a large increase. We find again that more 
established firms are less likely to experience a large change, but the number of years since listing 
is not significant. Firms with better performance and higher turnover are less likely to experience 
a large increase.  
The contracting and managerial discretion approaches suggest that changes in ownership 
should result from changes in firm characteristics. To explore the predictions from the theories, 
we use as explanatory variables the changes in firm characteristics from the year before to the 
year of the large change in ownership. Since returns are changes in the value of the common 
stock, we do not difference returns. The results are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 shows that a firm’s contemporaneous and lagged stock returns are significant 
predictors of large decreases in ownership. In contrast, the contemporaneous stock return is not 
significant in the regression for large increases and the lagged stock return is only significant at 
the 10% level with a coefficient in absolute value roughly half the coefficient of the large 
decrease regression. The regressions demonstrate a lack in symmetry in the relation between 
stock returns and large ownership changes when we separate large decreases and large increases. 
This asymmetry can not be explained by contracting models which predict a monotonic, but not   22
causal, relation between optimal managerial ownership and firm value. However, such an 
asymmetry makes sense in the context of the managerial discretion theory. With that theory, we 
expect ownership to fall as the firm does well enough that managers can reduce their ownership 
without any adverse effect. In contrast, managers increase their stake when doing so helps them 
maintain or increase the value of their stake in the firm and the value of their private benefits.  
There is no reason for poor stock returns alone to indicate to management that a greater stake will 
be beneficial.   
Large decreases and increases in managerial ownership are more likely if the level of 
managerial ownership is high. The probability of a large decrease in managerial ownership as 
well as the probability of a large increase is negatively related to the change in managerial 
ownership of the previous year. It would not be surprising if managers reduced their ownership 
over time in such a way as to limit the market impact of their trades. In this case, past decreases 
would predict future decreases, which is what we observe. However, it is puzzling that large 
increases are more likely following decreases in ownership.
6 Firms with an increase in R&D are 
more likely to experience a decrease in ownership and less likely to experience an increase in 
ownership, which seems inconsistent with the contracting theory. Firms that stop paying 
dividends are more likely to experience an increase in managerial ownership, but there is no 
association of dividend termination or initiation with a large decrease in ownership. Firms that 
increase in size are more likely to experience a large decrease in ownership and less likely to 
experience a large increase. Changes in turnover are never significant for NYSE firms. For 
NASDAQ firms, an increase in turnover makes it less likely that a firm will experience a large 
increase in ownership and more likely that a firm will experience a large decrease in ownership. 
Finally, firms with a COB or CEO change are more likely to experience a decrease in ownership 
                                                 
6 One concern we had with this result is that it could be driven by reversals due to data errors. We therefore 
investigated cases of large decreases followed by large increases. We concluded that the cases we 
examined were not explained by data errors, but rather by managerial changes.    23
but not more likely to experience an increase in ownership. The probability of a large change in 
ownership is not related to a change in the chairman of the board.  
A concern one might have with our regression estimates is that we estimate the same equation 
for firms with very different levels of ownership. To investigate whether our results depend on 
the level of ownership, we re-estimate the regressions for large decreases and increases in 
ownership for quintiles of ownership with breakpoints determined annually but do not report the 
results in a table. The sample for each regression is one fifth of the sample for the regressions of 
Table 5.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the level of significance drops. Most variables are not 
consistently significant across the five quintiles. However, the contemporaneous return is positive 
and significant across the five quintiles for large decreases in ownership. The coefficients on 
R&D, firm size, and the past return are positive and significant for four quintiles in the probit 
regressions for large decreases. The ownership level is significant in three regressions, but it is 
negative and significant for the two quintiles with the lowest ownership and positive and 
significant for the quintile with the highest ownership in the large decrease regressions. The other 
firm characteristics are significant in at most two regressions. These regressions suggest therefore 
that the coefficients on firm characteristics other than R&D, firm size, and returns are fragile once 
we split the sample into ownership quintiles and re-estimate the large decrease regressions. As for 
the regressions by ownership quintile of large increases, very few variables are significant. The 
contemporaneous return is never significant at the five percent level. The lagged change in 
ownership is negative and significant in the three highest quintiles. Decreases in the book value of 
assets in the prior period make it more likely that ownership increases in three out of five 
quintiles.  
Managerial ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of shares held by managers 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. This definition is conventional, but it provides 
an incomplete assessment of the incentive effects of managerial ownership changes because 
managerial ownership defined this way could fall even though managers increase the number of   24
shares they hold. Such an outcome is possible if a firm increases its number of shares by a 
sufficiently large amount. We know from the literature that firms issue shares following good 
performance and when q is high. Hence, it could be that the negative relation between the 
probability of a large decrease in managerial ownership and q is simply due to an increase in the 
number of shares. One would generally expect a decrease in managerial ownership brought about 
by an increase in the number of outstanding shares to affect managerial incentives differently 
from a decrease in managerial ownership resulting from a sale of shares by management. To 
allow for such a differential effect, we decompose the change in the ownership share of insiders. 
To perform this decomposition, we follow Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) and define Δαt to 
be the change in the ownership share of insiders from t to t+1, St to be the number of shares held 
by insiders at date t, St+1 = St + ΔS the number of shares held by insiders at date t+1, and Nt the 
firm’s number of outstanding shares at date t. The ownership share of insiders at t, αt, is equal to 
St/Nt.  With this notation, we have: 
  





tt t t t t
t
tt t t t t t
tt tt t
tt tt t tt t
t
tt
SS S S S S S S
NN N NN N N
SN SN S N SS
NN NN N NN N
SN
NN





⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −Δ Δ








   (1)   
 
The first term in the last line of equation (1) is the change in α explained by changes in the 
number of shares held by insiders (the numerator of the fractional ownership formula). The 
second term is the change in insider ownership brought about by a change in the number of shares 
outstanding (the denominator of the fractional ownership formula). 
Table 6 shows the marginal effects of probit regressions of the decomposed large decrease in 
ownership (columns 1 and 2) and of the decomposed large increase in ownership (columns 3 and 
4) on economic determinants. We set the indicator variable for a large decrease or increase in   25
shares held equal to one if the first term of equation (1) exceeds 2.5% in absolute value, and we 
set the indicator variable for a large increase or decrease in shares outstanding equal to one if the 
second term is greater than 2.5% in absolute value. It is quite clear that managers are more likely 
to sell shares when the firm’s stock market performance is good contemporaneously and was 
good the previous year. There is no evidence that they make large purchases of shares when the 
firm’s stock market performance is poor or was poor. Such evidence is hard to reconcile with 
timing theories of changes in managerial ownership. Firms whose assets grow are more likely to 
experience managerial sales and equity issues, and are less likely to experience managerial 
purchases and share repurchases. An increase in leverage, a termination of dividends, and a drop 
in turnover (for NASDAQ firms only) make it more likely that insiders will buy shares. As 
idiosyncratic volatility increases, managers are less likely to increase the firm’s total number of 
shares. Changes in idiosyncratic volatility are not related to the probability of large sales or large 
purchases of shares by managers. A change in the chairman of the board or in the chief executive 
officer makes it more likely that shares held by managers will experience a large drop.   
The evidence in Table 6 suggests that managers sell shares when the firm’s stock is 
performing well and its assets are growing. In contrast, contemporaneous and lagged firm returns 
are not significant in the regression for large purchases of shares. The variables that are 
significantly related to large purchases are variables that proxy for financial constraints. In 
particular, managers are more likely to buy shares if the firm stops paying dividends and if the 
firm’s leverage increases. Asset growth makes it less likely that managers will buy shares. There 
is no evidence that managerial ownership changes are negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility 
changes.  
There is a striking asymmetry between the determinants of large decreases in managerial 
ownership and of large increases in managerial ownership. Firm characteristics besides returns 
seem more important in explaining large increases in the number of shares than large decreases in 
shares held by managers. In contrast, firm characteristics besides returns seem more important in   26
explaining large increases in shares held by managers than they are in explaining large decreases 
in shares outstanding. There is nothing in the contracting theory which suggests such an 
asymmetry. In fact, with that theory, firm characteristics besides returns should play a key role in 
explaining changes in managerial ownership and they should explain changes in managers’ share 
holdings. 
 
Section 5. Dynamics of managerial ownership and Tobin’s q 
In this section, we examine how changes in managerial ownership are related to changes in 
Tobin’s q. We start with an investigation of the relation between changes in Tobin’s q and past 
changes in managerial ownership. These regressions answer the question of whether a decrease in 
managerial ownership is followed by a decrease in q. Since the changes in q follow the change in 
managerial ownership and we estimate a firm-fixed effects regression to control for unobservable 
firm characteristics, it is reasonable to treat the change in managerial ownership as exogenous 
relative to the change in q.  
Table 7 reports the results of the regressions of changes in q on lagged changes in ownership. 
We control for firm and year fixed effects and allow for clustering at the firm level. Strikingly, 
the first regression is extremely supportive of the literature that concludes that there is a positive 
impact of ownership on firm value. The coefficient on the lagged change in ownership is positive 
and significant. The result might seem surprising in light of the inability of Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) to find a significant relation in regressions using fixed effects. 
However, their regressions use levels of variables instead of changes, and they focus on the 
contemporaneous relation between Tobin’s q and ownership. Further, our panel is larger, both 
with respect to the cross-section and the time series, and has more heterogeneous managerial 
ownership. In the next regression, we distinguish between lagged increases in ownership and 
lagged decreases. The regression coefficients are significant for the lagged increases as well as   27
the lagged decreases. Note that a positive coefficient on lagged decreases means that a decrease in 
ownership precedes a decrease in Tobin’s q. The regressions reproduced in columns 1 and 2 use 
explanatory variables that are common in the literature. In columns 3 and 4, we re-estimate these 
regressions but include the stock performance variables we found to be particularly important in 
predicting changes in ownership. Adding the stock performance variables reduces sharply the size 
of the coefficient on lagged changes in ownership. The coefficient is still significant, but now it is 
only significant at the 10% level. In column 4, we re-estimate the regression where we allow for 
different slopes for lagged increases in ownership and lagged decreases. Now, the coefficient on 
lagged decreases in ownership is no longer significant but the coefficient on lagged increases in 
ownership is similar to what it was in column 2. The final two columns use indicator variables for 
large changes. Column 5 shows that large increases and large decreases have again significant 
coefficients indicating that large increases precede an increase in q and large decreases precede a 
decrease in q. However, when the stock market performance variables are added, there is no 
relation between large decreases in ownership and subsequent changes in q. The relation between 
large increases in ownership and increases in q is preserved. 
Table 7 shows that it is critical in such regressions to control for stock market performance 
because large decreases in ownership are much more likely to occur after good performance. If 
there is a relation between stock market performance and future changes in q, the coefficient on 
the change in managerial ownership is biased when stock market performance is omitted. In 
Tables 5 and 6, we saw that stock market performance plays a much bigger role in explaining 
large decreases in ownership than it does in explaining large increases in ownership. It is 
therefore not surprising that controlling for concurrent and past stock returns has a much greater 
impact on the coefficient for ownership decreases than for ownership increases. 
To understand better the relation between managerial ownership changes and changes in 
Tobin’s q, we now decompose the managerial ownership change into the change caused by 
managerial purchases or sales and the change caused by changes in the number of shares   28
outstanding. We report the results in Table 8. The results strengthen the asymmetry highlighted in 
Table 7. We see that there is no relation between past large decreases in shares owned by 
management and future changes in Tobin’s q. Though there is a negative relation between large 
increases in shares outstanding and future changes in Tobin’s q when we do not control for past 
stock returns, this relation is weaker when we use the indicator variable and disappears for the 
level variable. In contrast, the relation between past large increases in shares held by management 
and future changes in Tobin’s q is positive and significant at the 10% level in each specification. 
The relation between decreases in shares outstanding and Tobin’s q is insignificant in three 
specifications out of four.  
Tables 7 and 8 provide no evidence that large decreases in managerial ownership lead to 
decreases in Tobin’s q. However, there is evidence that large increases in managerial ownership 
lead to increases in Tobin’s q. A concern with our evidence is that theories do not necessarily 
predict a monotone relation between ownership and firm value. For instance, Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988) predict that firm value increases with share ownership up to a 
point and falls after that point over some range. It could be, therefore, that we do not find a 
negative relation between a decrease in ownership and change in firm value because we include 
both firms for which ownership decreases increase firm value and firms for which they decrease 
firm value. Following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
the cross-sectional literature takes into account the non-monotonicity of the relation between firm 
value and ownership by allowing this relation to be non-linear. With our approach, allowing for 
non-linearities does not really address the issue we are concerned about.  A large decrease in 
ownership could have a positive impact if ownership is high and a negative impact if ownership is 
low.  
We could re-estimate our regressions allowing the relation between ownership changes and 
changes in q to be conditional on the level of ownership. Alternatively, we can estimate our 
regressions separately for firms that have different levels of ownership. Table 9 shows estimates   29
of the regression of column 2 of Table 8 for different ownership quintiles. We form quintiles 
yearly, but the breakpoints remain stable over time. The results in Table 9 show that the 
coefficients on large increases and decreases in shares held by management are never significant. 
The coefficient on the large increase in shares outstanding indicator variable is negative and 
significant in three quintile regressions, which suggests that decreases in Tobin’s q are driven by 
past increases in shares outstanding rather than active selling by managers. 
One may argue that the quintile regressions of Table 9 are more likely to suffer from the 
critique by Zhou (2001) that a firm-fixed effects regression would not be able to identify effects 
when there is little time variation. We therefore repeat the regressions of Table 9 with industry-
fixed effects (not reported). At the five percent level, there is no quintile in which large decreases 
in shares held by management are associated with changes in Tobin’s q and one quintile (quintile 
3) in which large increases in shares held by management are positively associated with changes 
in Tobin’s q. 
Together, Tables 7 through 9 show that estimates of the relation between past changes in 
managerial ownership and changes in Tobin’s q are sensitive to controlling for past stock returns. 
Without controlling for past stock returns, there is a linear relation between changes in Tobin’s q 
and past changes in managerial ownership. However, after controlling for past stock returns, there 
is only evidence of a relation between large increases in managerial ownership and changes in 
Tobin’s q. When we decompose the change in managerial ownership into changes in the 
numerator (shares held by managers) and changes in the denominator (shares outstanding), we 
find that increases in shares held by managers are associated with future increases in Tobin’s q, 
but the effect is not strong enough to hold up when we split the sample into size quintiles. All this 
evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of the agency theory and of the contracting theory 
since neither of these theories predict that there is a relation between Tobin’s q and past changes 
in managerial ownership only for past increases in managerial ownership. The evidence is 
consistent with the managerial discretion theory, because it predicts that managers will not sell   30
shares when doing so will have an adverse impact on the firm, but may buy shares to increase 
firm value, perhaps for signaling reasons or to provide financing to a financially constrained firm.   
 
Section 6. Dynamics of managerial ownership and Tobin’s q: The contemporaneous 
relation  
We now turn to the contemporaneous relation between changes in Tobin’s q and changes in 
ownership. Admittedly, the contemporaneous relation is harder to evaluate because the change in 
Tobin‘s q could be causing the change in ownership. However, the focus of the existing literature 
has been on how endogeneity could explain a positive relation between Tobin’s q and managerial 
ownership. If we were to find a different relation or no relation at all, our finding would have 
important implications for that literature. In column 1 of Table 10, we use indicator variables for 
large changes. Surprisingly, both large increases and large decreases in managerial ownership are 
associated with positive increases in Tobin’s q. One might be tempted to argue that this shows 
that firms always move towards the optimum, but things are more complicated as revealed when 
we decompose the large increases and the large decreases as we did before. In column 2, we use 
indicator variables. We find that there is no contemporaneous relation between large decreases in 
shares held by managers and changes in Tobin’s q, but there is a positive relation between 
changes in q and large increases in shares held. We find that large increases in shares outstanding 
are associated with an increase in q and large decreases with a decrease in q. In the last column, 
we use actual changes in the ownership variables conditional on large changes. We show that the 
variables associated with large increases in shares held by management are insignificant. In 
contrast, the variables associated with large decreases are significant. Large decreases in shares 
held by management are associated with firm value increases and large increases in shares 
outstanding are associated with firm value increases as well. Though we do not reproduce the 
results in a table, we also estimate regression (1) of Table 10 for quintiles of ownership. We find   31
that the coefficient on large increases in ownership is never significant but the coefficient on large 
drops is positive and significant for quintiles 2, 3, and 4.  
McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2006) examine the announcement return associated with 
insider purchases. They find that the announcement return first increases in pre-purchase insider 
ownership and then falls. In contrast, we find mixed evidence on the relation between changes in 
firm value and large increases in firm ownership. We show that there is a positive relation 
between the change in q and the indicator variable for large increases in insider ownership, but 
we find no relation between the change in q and the level of the large increase in insider 
ownership. When we investigate whether the relation between the change in q and the change in 
insider ownership depends on the level of insider ownership, we find no evidence that q increases 
for large increases in ownership by managers with low insider holdings.  
The sample of McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2006) differs substantially from ours. In 
particular, they use insider purchases from 1994 through 1999, while we investigate changes in 
managerial ownership from 1988 through 2003. Much of our analysis focuses on managerial 
ownership changes of at least 2.5%. In contrast, their median insider purchase is for 0.15% of a 
firm’s outstanding number of shares (even though they only include purchases of at least 10,000 
shares). They focus only on open market insider purchases whereas we focus on the change in 
managerial ownership irrespective of how that change came about. These sample differences 
could explain the difference in the results.  They argue that an advantage of their approach is that 
it is less likely that other events will affect the change in firm value over the short period of time 
over which they measure the change in firm value. This advantage might also contribute to the 
difference between our results and theirs, but our approach is powerful enough to find 
coefficients that are inconsistent with the agency approach when we investigate managerial 
ownership decreases (which they do not consider).   
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Section 7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of managerial ownership and their implications for 
firm value. We find that managerial ownership is more likely to fall when the firm’s stock 
performs or has performed well. However, managerial ownership is not more likely to increase 
when the stock is performing poorly and there is only a weak relation between past poor 
performance and managerial ownership increases. Such an asymmetry in the relation between 
managerial ownership and stock returns cannot be explained in a straightforward way by 
contracting models. We also find that the relation between the probability of large changes in 
ownership and changes in firm characteristic is, for some variables such as R&D, inconsistent 
with the predictions of contracting models.  
We then turn to the relation between changes in ownership and changes in Tobin’s q. We find 
the same asymmetry we document when studying the dynamics of managerial ownership. We 
find no evidence that past decreases in managerial ownership lead to decreases in Tobin’s q, but 
we find some evidence that past increases in managerial ownership lead to increases in Tobin’s q. 
When we estimate the contemporaneous relation between changes in Tobin’s q and changes in 
managerial ownership, we find that both large decreases and large increases in managerial 
ownership are associated with an increase in Tobin’s q. Consequently, the relation between 
changes in firm value and changes in ownership is u-shaped. The correlation between ownership 
decreases and Tobin’s q increases is driven by the fact that insiders sell when the stock is 
performing well and firms issue equity when the stock is performing well. While none of our 
evidence is consistent with a negative relation between ownership changes and changes in 
Tobin‘s q for some range of ownership levels, some of our evidence supports the view that an 
increase in managerial ownership is associated with an increase in Tobin’s q. The lack of a 
negative relation between changes in Tobin’s q and contemporaneous or lagged decreases in 
managerial ownership for any level of managerial ownership is hard to reconcile with the agency 
theory.    33
To make sense of our evidence, we argue that a new theory of managerial ownership is 
required. With this theory, managerial ownership is driven by insiders’ objective to maximize 
their welfare. Insiders own shares to provide financing, to signal that the firm has high value, to 
convince outsiders that they have the right incentives, and to protect their control of the firm. 
Insiders reduce their ownership when they can do so without taking the risk of losing control of 
the firm, of decreasing the value of their stake, and of decreasing the value of their private 
benefits of control. As a result, insiders sell when the firm is doing well and has done well 
because the market for the shares is liquid and because their control of the firm is secure. Insiders 
buy shares when doing so is beneficial to them. They may do so when a contest for control 
becomes more likely, when they want to decrease the firm’s cost of capital, and when they are the 
cheapest source of financing for the firm. It is possible for all these motives for managerial 
ownership increases to lead to increases in the share price. It is perfectly possible for the firm’s 
performance to be poor and yet for insiders to choose not to increase their ownership stake. We 
call this the managerial discretion theory of inside ownership. Future work should develop and 
test this theory further, but we are optimistic that it provides a good foundation for understanding 
both the dynamics of managerial ownership and the relation between changes in managerial 
ownership and firm value.   34
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Average Ownership Levels and Changes by Calendar Year 
 
The table shows sample summary statistics of the director and officer ownership data. The sample period is fiscal year end 1988 to 
2003. The data is listed by fiscal year. Number of firms is the number of firms for each fiscal year for which we have complete data on 
the change in ownership and other key variables as explained in section 2. D & O ownership is the average level of officer and 
director ownership as of the record date. Change in ownership is the average change in D & O ownership from one fiscal year to the 
next. Positive change is the change in D & O ownership conditional on a positive change, and negative change is the change in D & O 
ownership conditional on a negative change. A large drop (large increase) in the level of D & O ownership is defined as a change in 
ownership of at least minus (plus) 2.5 percent. The last four columns show the percentage of firms that have an ownership level of at 
least 20, 30, 40, or 50 percent, respectively.  
 
               %   o f   f i r m s   w i t h    
Fiscal   Number   D&O ownership  Change ownership  Positive change  Negative change  Large  Large  % of firms with ownership level 
Year of  Firms  Mean  Median  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  drop  increase  > 20 %  > 30%  >40%  > 50% 
1988  845  23.1%  17.4%            45.2%  31.8%  21.9%  13.4% 
1989  1396 24.4% 19.6% -0.6% -0.1%  1.6%  0.0%  -2.1% -0.1% 19.5% 14.0% 49.3% 33.9%  22.5%  13.8% 
1990  1404 24.8% 19.9% -0.5%  0.0%  1.6%  0.0%  -2.1%  0.0% 19.2% 13.7% 49.8% 35.8%  23.4%  14.9% 
1991  1532 24.4% 19.1% -1.2% -0.2%  1.4%  0.0%  -2.7% -0.2% 23.3% 12.8% 48.6% 34.9%  23.2%  13.7% 
1992  1588 23.3% 17.6% -1.0% -0.2%  1.4%  0.0%  -2.3% -0.2% 21.9% 11.1% 45.8% 32.6%  21.2%  13.2% 
1993  1668 21.2% 15.2% -1.5% -0.3%  1.1%  0.0%  -2.7% -0.3% 23.5%  8.5% 41.3% 28.6%  17.3%  10.0% 
1994  1812 21.1% 14.9% -1.1% -0.1%  1.0%  0.0%  -2.1% -0.1% 19.9%  9.1% 41.9% 27.6%  17.3%  10.2% 
1995  1761 21.8% 15.9% -1.3% -0.2%  1.2%  0.0%  -2.5% -0.2% 23.2% 10.2% 42.6% 28.5%  17.8%  10.7% 
1996  1575 21.7% 14.6% -1.4% -0.2%  1.3%  0.0%  -2.6% -0.2% 24.4% 10.5% 41.1% 28.6%  18.6%  11.5% 
1997  1746 21.4% 14.8% -1.7% -0.2%  1.2%  0.0%  -2.8% -0.2% 24.6% 10.4% 40.3% 28.1%  17.4%  11.2% 
1998  2134 22.4% 15.8% -0.3%  0.0%  1.6%  0.0%  -2.0%  0.0% 19.0% 14.7% 42.4% 29.7%  19.4%  11.9% 
1999  2313 22.9% 16.4% -0.5%  0.1%  1.7%  0.1%  -2.1%  0.0% 20.6% 16.3% 44.1% 30.2%  19.7%  12.5% 
2000  2270 23.0% 15.6% -0.7%  0.0%  1.5%  0.0%  -2.2%  0.0% 21.1% 16.3% 43.5% 30.1%  21.4%  13.8% 
2001  2070 22.4% 15.1% -0.7%  0.0%  1.6%  0.0%  -2.3%  0.0% 20.8% 13.4% 41.7% 29.0%  19.7%  12.9% 
2002  1743 21.5% 14.5% -0.6%  0.1%  1.3%  0.1%  -1.9%  0.0% 17.5% 14.0% 40.3% 27.2%  19.2%  11.6% 
2003  1779 19.1% 11.8% -1.7% -0.2%  1.2%  0.0%  -2.9% -0.2% 25.0%  8.5% 34.6% 22.3%  15.3%  8.6% 
Overall 27636  22.4% 15.8% -0.9% -0.1%  1.4%  0.0%  -2.3% -0.1% 21.2% 12.4% 43.3% 29.9%  19.7%  12.1% 
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Table 2: Are ownership changes caused primarily by large increases and decreases 
of at least 2.5 percent? 
 
The table shows results of annual ordinary least squares regressions of the percentage 
D&O ownership change on decomposed changes in percentage ownership. The two 
independent variables, large negative change and large positive changes, are defined as 
follows. Large negative change is equal to the change in D&O ownership if D&O 
ownership is smaller than -2.5%, and zero otherwise. Large positive change is equal to 
the change in D&O ownership if D&O ownership is larger than 2.5%, and zero 
otherwise. The last row reports coefficients from a pooled time-series/cross-sectional 
regression. All coefficients are highly significant. The sample is described in detail in 




Fiscal  Number  Large neg. Large pos. Adjusted 
Year of  obs.  change change  R-square 
1988 845  1.002  0.997  0.986 
1989 1396  0.998  1.002  0.990 
1990 1404  1.000  1.000  0.989 
1991 1532  0.996  1.004  0.991 
1992 1588  0.995  1.004  0.990 
1993 1688  0.995  1.004  0.990 
1994 1812  0.998  1.002  0.982 
1995 1761  0.997  1.003  0.988 
1996 1575  1.000  1.000  0.987 
1997 1746  0.999  1.001  0.989 
1998 2134  1.004  0.997  0.986 
1999 2313  1.008  0.993  0.985 
2000 2270  1.002  0.998  0.986 
2001 2070  1.003  0.998  0.989 
2002 1743  1.006  0.991  0.984 
2003 1779  0.999  1.000  0.990 
Pooled 27636  1.000  1.000  0.988 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of data by data source  
 
The table reports means and medians of the variables employed in the regressions. Variables are reported by database of origin. The first two columns report 
means and medians for all firm-year observations in which neither a large increase or decrease of at least 2.5% in D&O ownership is observed. Columns 3 and 4 
report means and medians across all firm-year observations in which a decrease of at least 2.5% in D&O ownership is observed. Columns 5 and 6 report means 
and medians across all firm-year observations in which an increase of at least 2.5% is observed. The last three columns report p-values of Wilcoxon rank tests for 
equality of medians across the three groups. From the main Compact Disclosure database, we derive all variables for D&O ownership. From the 
CompactDisclosure Director database, we derive changes in the chief executive officer and chairman of the board position. From the CRSP database, we 
calculate firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous two fiscal years, annualized average daily NYSE turnover, annualized average daily NASDAQ 
turnover, idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a market model and based on daily returns, and years since the first listing on CRSP. From the Compustat 
database, we derive research and development expenditures over assets; a no R&D dummy equal to 1 if the firm has missing research and development 
expenditures for that year; a dividend payer indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm has paid a dividend in that year; the logarithm of book-value-of-assets; 
capital expenditures over assets; a proxy for Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value is 
calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes; free cash flow, 
defined as EBITDA over sales; property, plant, and equipment over total assets; and leverage, defined as total liabilities over book value of assets. All Compustat 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level, respectively 
 
        Wilcoxon Test of equality of 
  No change    Large Drop    Large Increase    medians (p-values) 
  18609 obs.    6015 obs.    3488 obs.    No chg. vs.  No chg. vs.  Lg. drop vs. 
  Mean  Median     Mean  Median     Mean  Median     Large drop  Lg. increase Lg.  increase 
CompactDisclosure Variables                   
Percentage  ownership  18.9%  11.0%  24.4%  20.6%  36.3%  32.9%   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Percentage  ownership  (t-1)  18.9%  11.1%  34.1%  30.7%  27.4%  23.3%   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Percentage ownership (t-2)   19.5%  11.7%    35.2%  32.4%    28.6%  25.1%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Change in percentage ownership   0.0%  0.0%    -9.7%  -6.4%    8.9%  5.2%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Ownership > 20%   34.4%  0.0%    51.1%  100.0%    73.5%  100.0%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Ownership > 30%   23.9%  0.0%    32.4%  0.0%    54.8%  100.0%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Ownership > 40%   16.1%  0.0%    18.6%  0.0%    38.8%  0.0%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Ownership > 50%   9.9%  0.0%    10.0%  0.0%    26.1%  0.0%    0.890  0.000  0.000 
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Table 3, continued  
  No change    Large Drop    Large Increase    Wilcoxon Test of eq. of medians (p-values) 
  18609 observations    6015 observations    3488 observations    No-drop vs.  No-drop vs.  Lg. drop vs. 
  Mean Median  Mean Median   Mean  Median    Large drop  Lg. increase Lg.  increase 
Compustat Variables                      
R&D  /  assets  0.04 0.00    0.06 0.00   0.05 0.00    0.000  0.000  0.000 
No  R&D  dummy  0.52 1.00    0.52 1.00   0.47 0.00    0.450  0.000  0.000 
Dividend  Payer    0.38 0.00    0.16 0.00   0.19 0.00    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log (book value of assets)   5.38  5.21    4.36  4.28    4.16  4.08    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Capex  /  assets    0.07 0.05    0.07 0.05   0.07 0.04    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Q  1.95 1.39    2.26 1.51   1.62 1.18    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Free  Cash  Flow  0.09 0.11    0.03 0.09   0.03 0.08    0.000  0.000  0.000 
PPE  /  Assets    0.31 0.26    0.27 0.20   0.28 0.22    0.000  0.000  0.002 
Leverage    0.42 0.41    0.42 0.40   0.44 0.43    0.165  0.000  0.000 
                      
CompactDisclosure – Directors                     
Concurrent change in CEO  10.6%  0.0%    12.7%  0.0%    11.1%  0.0%    0.000  0.386  0.031 
Concurrent change in COB  8.7%  0.0%    12.3%  0.0%    8.7%  0.0%    0.000  0.969  0.000 
Change in CEO over next year  9.1%  0.0%    10.2%  0.0%    8.6%  0.0%    0.010  0.367  0.011 
Change in COB over next year  10.0%  0.0%    9.1%  0.0%    9.8%  0.0%    0.108  0.814  0.345 
                      
CRSP Variables                         
Concurrent return   16.1%  4.3%    46.2%  13.1%    16.0%  -3.0%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Concurrent industry return  18.5%  12.1%    25.6%  16.1%    16.0%  9.8%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Concurrent market return  12.8%  14.0%    14.5%  15.2%    11.3%  13.7%    0.000  0.001  0.000 
Lagged return  15.9%  2.3%    30.6%  7.1%    8.0%  -6.7%    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Lagged industry return  13.6%  9.2%    14.0%  8.9%    12.9%  8.4%    0.393  0.028  0.205 
Lagged market return   11.1%  13.6%    10.7%  13.0%    12.3%  13.7%    0.627  0.000  0.001 
Turnover NYSE   0.38  0.00    0.19  0.00    0.19  0.00    0.000  0.000  0.002 
Turnover NASDAQ  0.85  0.15    1.14  0.67    0.87  0.42    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Idiosyncratic volatility  0.04  0.03    0.04  0.04    0.05  0.04    0.000  0.000  0.024 
Years since first listing on CRSP  17.46  12.10    10.22  6.67    12.72  8.76    0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 4: Probit regressions of large changes in ownership on economic determinants 
 
The table reports marginal effects of a probit regression of large decreases (column 1) and large increases (column2) in 
D&O ownership. The dependent variable is equal to one if ownership decreases (increases) by more than 2.5%, and 
zero otherwise. The regressions are estimated on the pooled time-series and cross-sectional sample. The independent 
variables are: the percentage of director and officer ownership at the beginning of the year, research and development 
expenditures over assets; a No R&D dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has missing research and development expenditures 
for that year; a dividend payer indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm has paid a dividend in that year; the logarithm of 
book-value-of-assets; capital expenditures over assets; free cash flow, defined as EBITDA over sales; property, plant, 
and equipment over total assets; leverage, defined as total liabilities over book value of assets; annualized average daily 
NYSE turnover if traded on NYSE, and zero, otherwise; annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on 
NASDAQ, and zero, otherwise; idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a market model and based on daily returns; 
firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous fiscal year; firm-, industry- and market-returns over the current 
fiscal year; years since the first listing on CRSP; and indicator variables equal to one if the firm has a concurrent 
change in the chairman or CEO position. All accounting variables are sampled at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
The regressions include year-fixed effects (not reported). Columns 3 and 4 contain mean and standard deviation of the 
independent variables to facilitate the interpretation of the marginal effects. Standard errors (not reported) are corrected 
for clustering at the firm level. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
   Large    Sample 
 Large  drop  Increase    Mean  Std.  Dev. 
D&O ownership (t-1)  0.507***  -0.044***  0.223  0.202 
R&D / assets  0.112***  -0.190***  0.047  0.091 
No R&D dummy  0.005  0.005    0.379  0.485 
Dividend payer   -0.047***  -0.020***    0.324  0.468 
Log (book value assets)  -0.008***  -0.033***  5.211  1.889 
Capex / assets  0.099*  -0.121***    0.071  0.069 
Free  cash  flow  -0.031***  -0.018*   0.075 0.261 
PPE / Assets  -0.052***  0.017    0.301  0.22 
Leverage 0.019  0.071***    0.424  0.221 
Turnover NYSE  0.027***  -0.017***    0.353  0.585 
Turnover NASDAQ  0.019***  -0.005**    0.932  1.46 
Idiosyncratic volatility  -0.977***  0.371***    0.038  0.021 
Concurrent return  0.034***  -0.006***  0.233  1.117 
Concurrent industry return  0.038***  -0.028***  0.2  0.431 
Concurrent market return  -0.013  0.030    0.126  0.193 
Lagged return  0.023***  -0.015***    0.189  0.994 
Lagged industry return  0.018  -0.023***  0.137  0.381 
Lagged market return  0.015  0.054*    0.108  0.184 
Years since first listing on CRSP  -0.003***  0.000    15.745  15.148 
Concurrent change in chairman   0.094***  -0.007    0.092  0.29 
Concurrent change in CEO position  0.026***  0.002    0.107  0.309 
Number of observations  21792  21792       
Observed probability  0.207  0.120       
Predicted probability  0.172  0.100       
Pseudo-R2 0.138  0.082         41
Table 5: Large changes in ownership on changes in explanatory variables 
 
The table reports marginal effects of a probit regression of large decreases (column 1) and large increases 
in ownership (column2) on changes in dependent variables. The dependent variable in column 1 (column 2) 
is equal to one if ownership drops (increases) by more than 2.5%, and zero otherwise. The regressions are 
estimated on the pooled time-series and cross-sectional sample. The independent variables are: the 
percentage of director and officer ownership at the beginning of the year and the change in D&O ownership 
over the previous year. Research and development expenditures over assets; a No R&D dummy, equal to 1 
if the firm has missing research and development expenditures for that year; a dividend initiation 
(termination) variable, equal to 1 if the firm has started (ceased) to pay a dividend; the logarithm of book-
value-of-assets; capital expenditures over assets; free cash flow, defined as EBITDA over sales; property, 
plant, and equipment over total assets; leverage, defined as total liabilities over book value of assets; 
annualized average daily NYSE turnover if traded on NYSE, and zero, otherwise; annualized average daily 
NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, and zero, otherwise; idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a 
market model and based on daily returns; firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous fiscal year; 
firm-, industry- and market-returns over the current fiscal year. All accounting variables are calculated as 
changes from two fiscal years prior to the end of the previous fiscal year. The regressions include year-
fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors (not reported) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. 
(***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
  Large drop  Large increase 
Level of D&O ownership  0.534***  0.143***   
Change in D&O ownership  -0.257***  -0.181***   
Change R&D / assets  0.310***  -0.130**   
Change in No R&D dummy  -0.019  -0.006   
Dividend initiation   -0.002  -0.020   
Dividend termination  -0.025  0.045**   
Change in Log (book value assets)  0.092***  -0.054***   
Change in Capex / assets  -0.099*  -0.048   
Change in Free cash flow  0.009  0.021   
Change in PPE / Assets  0.102*  -0.017   
Change in Leverage  0.027  0.078***   
Change in Turnover NYSE  -0.004  -0.001   
Change in Turnover NASDAQ  0.007*  -0.008**   
Change in Idiosyncratic volatility  -0.245  0.339   
Concurrent return  0.036***  -0.004   
Concurrent industry return  0.058***  -0.029***   
Concurrent market return  -0.051  0.038   
Lagged return  0.023***  -0.013*   
Lagged industry return  0.036***  -0.020**   
Lagged market return  0.016  0.080**   
Concurrent change in COB  0.090***  -0.012   
Concurrent change in CEO  0.024**  -0.006   
Number of observations  17040  17040   
Observed probability  0.195 0.115   
Predicted probability  0.169 0.106   
Pseudo R2  0.116  0.038   
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Table 6: Decomposition of ownership changes and changes in explanatory variables 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions of the decomposition of large decreases (column 1-3) and large 
increases (column4-6) in ownership on changes in dependent variables. The decomposition is done as in Helwege, 
Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007). The dependent variables in columns 1 to 4 are defined as follows. In column 1, it is equal to 
one if the change in shares held by insiders causes the large decrease of 2.5% or more in ownership. In column 2, it is 
equal to one if the change in shares outstanding causes the large decrease in ownership. The dependent variables of 
columns 3 and 4 are defined accordingly for large increases in ownership. The regressions are estimated on the pooled 
time-series and cross-sectional sample. The independent variables are expressed as changes and are defined as: the 
percentage of director and officer ownership at the beginning of the year, research and development expenditures over 
assets; a No R&D dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has missing research and development expenditures for that year; a 
dividend initiation (termination) indicator variable, equal to 1 if the firm started (ceased) to pay a dividend in that year; 
the logarithm of book-value-of-assets; capital expenditures over assets; free cash flow, defined as EBITDA over sales; 
property, plant, and equipment over total assets; leverage, defined as total liabilities over book value of assets; 
annualized average daily NYSE turnover if traded on NYSE, and zero, otherwise; annualized average daily NASDAQ 
turnover if traded on NASDAQ, and zero, otherwise; idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a market model and based 
on daily returns; firm-, industry- and market-returns over the previous fiscal year; firm-, industry- and market-returns 
over the current fiscal year. All accounting variables are calculated as changes from two fiscal years prior to the end of 
the previous fiscal year. The regressions include year-fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors (not reported) are 
corrected for clustering at the firm level. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance of the underlying 
coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 









Level of D&O ownership  0.343***  0.189***  0.081***  0.038*** 
Change in D&O ownership  -0.205***  -0.058***  -0.162***  -0.028*** 
Change R&D / assets  0.087  0.163***  -0.100*  -0.026* 
Change in No R&D dummy  -0.017  0.008  -0.003  0.000 
Dividend initiation   -0.017  0.008  -0.020  -0.002 
Dividend termination  -0.011  -0.013  0.045**  0.004 
Change in Log (book value assets)  0.027***  0.045***  -0.040***  -0.009*** 
Change in Capex / assets  -0.035  -0.033  -0.026  -0.013 
Change in Free cash flow  0.017  0.008  0.001  0.010*** 
Change in PPE / Assets  0.002  0.053*  0.000  -0.005 
Change in Leverage  -0.000  0.037**  0.080***  0.002 
Change in Turnover NYSE  -0.019**  0.015**  0.001  -0.003 
Change in Turnover NASDAQ  0.003  0.005**  -0.008**  -0.001* 
Change in Idiosyncratic volatility  0.015  -0.289**  0.316  0.026 
Concurrent return  0.004*  0.016***  -0.001  -0.003*** 
Concurrent industry return  0.039***  0.023***  -0.020**  -0.005** 
Concurrent market return  -0.059  -0.001  0.017  0.001 
Lagged return  0.006**  0.012***  -0.007  -0.004*** 
Lagged industry return  0.015*  0.021***  -0.013  -0.004* 
Lagged market return  -0.010  -0.013  0.018  0.018* 
Concurrent change in COB  0.088***  -0.004  -0.006  -0.004** 
Concurrent change in CEO  0.025***  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002 
Observed probability  0.130  0.069  0.094  0.017 
Predicted probability  0.112  0.050  0.089  0.010 
Pseudo-R2 0.080  0.163  0.023  0.121 
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Table 7: Changes in Q and changes in ownership 
 
The table reports coefficients from firm-fixed effects regressions of changes in q on lagged ownership changes and 
changes in other control variables. The dependent variable is the change from year t-1 to year t of a proxy for Tobin’s 
q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value is calculated as 
the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes. The first and third columns include the change in ownership, the second and fourth column decompose 
the change in ownership into positive and negative changes, and the fifth and sixth column includes two indicator 
variables equal to one if ownership increases (decreases) by at least 2.5%. The other independent variables are: the 
logarithm of book-value-of-assets; property, plant, and equipment over total assets; idiosyncratic volatility estimated 
from a market model and based on daily returns; free cash flow, defined as EBITDA over sales; research and 
development expenditures over assets; a No R&D dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has missing research and development 
expenditures for that year; capital expenditures over assets; annualized average daily NYSE turnover if traded on 
NYSE, and zero, otherwise; annualized average daily NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, and zero, otherwise; 
and lagged firm returns over the two previous fiscal years. All accounting variables represented changes from year t-2 
to year t-1. The regressions include year-fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Change in Ownership   0.524***   0.270*       
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.140)   (0.150)       
Positive Change    0.470**    0.522**     
  (from t-2 to t-1)   (0.215)    (0.232)     
Negative Change    0.555***    0.112     
  (from t-2 to t-1)   (0.212)    (0.223)     
Large Increase (2.5%) (t-1)        0.062**  0.069*** 
        (0.026)  (0.026) 
Large drop (2.5%) (t-1)        -0.092***  -0.021 
        (0.026)  (0.026) 
Change in Log (Book value)   -0.659*** -0.659*** -0.467***  -0.467*** -0.651***  -0.463*** 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)  (0.068) 
Change in Log (Book value)   0.138**  0.139**  0.130* 0.128* 0.136*  0.127* 
 squared  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.077) (0.077) (0.070)  (0.077) 
Change in  PPE / Assets   -0.202 -0.203 -0.488**  -0.486** -0.220  -0.492** 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.210) (0.211) (0.210)  (0.210) 
Change in  PPE / Assets  -0.221 -0.224 -0.270  -0.260 -0.230  -0.271 
 squared  (1.592)  (1.593)  (1.701) (1.700) (1.583)  (1.693) 
Change in Idiosyncratic Vol.   0.310  0.309  0.619 0.635 0.360  0.651 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.820)  (0.820)  (0.849) (0.850) (0.820)  (0.850) 
Change in  Free cash flow   -0.122 -0.122  0.033  0.033  -0.121 0.033 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.108)  (0.108)  (0.108) (0.108) (0.107)  (0.108) 
Change in  R&D / Assets   -0.478 -0.477 -0.625  -0.624 -0.472  -0.623 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.389)  (0.389)  (0.405) (0.405) (0.389)  (0.405) 
No R&D dummy   0.027  0.027  0.029 0.029 0.029  0.029 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.080) (0.080) (0.083)  (0.080) 
Change in  CapEx / Assets   -0.598*** -0.598*** -0.191  -0.190 -0.591***  -0.193 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.180) (0.180) (0.182)  (0.180) 
Change in Turnover NYSE      -0.093***  -0.094***    -0.093*** 
  (from t-2 to t-1)     (0.033)  (0.033)    (0.033) 
Change in Turnover NASD     -0.115***  -0.115***    -0.115*** 
  (from t-2 to t-1)     (0.019)  (0.019)    (0.019) 
Return (from t-2 to t-1)      -0.103***  -0.104***    -0.104*** 
     (0.021)  (0.021)    (0.021) 
Return (from t-3 to t-2)      -0.103***  -0.103***    -0.103*** 
     (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.015) 
Observations  21389  21389  20403 20403 21389  20403 
Number  of  clusters  4744  4744  4515 4515 4744  4515 
R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.12 0.12 0.10  0.12   44
Table 8: Changes in Q and changes in shares held and total shares outstanding 
 
The table reports coefficients from firm-fixed effects regressions of changes in q on lagged ownership changes and 
changes in other control variables. The dependent variable is the change from year t-1 to year t of a proxy for Tobin’s 
q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value is calculated as 
the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes; capital expenditures over assets. The large change of at least 2.5% in director and officer ownership is 
decomposed into changes caused by an increase or decrease in shares held by directors and officers, and changes 
caused by an increase or decrease in shares outstanding. The decomposition is done as in Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz 
(2007). Columns 1 and 2 include indicator variables that are equal to one if there was a large change in the numerator 
or denominator, and zero otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 include the actual change in the numerator and denominator, 
conditional on a large change. The other independent variables are: the logarithm of book-value-of-assets; property, 
plant, and equipment over total assets; idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a market model and based on daily 
returns; free cash flow, defined as EBITDA over sales; research and development expenditures over assets; a No R&D 
dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has missing research and development expenditures for that year; capital expenditures 
over assets; annualized average daily NYSE turnover if traded on NYSE, and zero, otherwise; annualized average daily 
NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, and zero, otherwise; and lagged firm returns over the two previous fiscal 
years. All accounting variables represented changes from year t-2 to year t-1. The regressions include year-fixed effects 
(not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. (***), (**), and (*) 
indicate statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Large decrease in shares held (t-1)  -0.010  0.007  0.309  -0.030 
 (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.222)  (0.230) 
Large increase in shares outstanding (t-1) -0.237***  -0.102**  -1.087***  -0.474 
 (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.293)  (0.309) 
Large increase shares held (t-1)  0.049*  0.055*  0.376*  0.436* 
 (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.216)  (0.230) 
Large decrease in shares outstanding (t-1)  0.072  0.087*  -0.540  -0.526 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.388)  (0.402) 
Change in Log (Book value (from t-2 to t-1))  -0.622***  -0.453***  -0.644***  -0.461*** 
 (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Change in Log (Book value squared  0.143**  0.131*  0.156**  0.141* 
 (0.070)  (0.077)  (0.072)  (0.079) 
Change in  PPE / Assets (from t-2 to t-1)  -0.222  -0.490**  -0.209  -0.481** 
 (0.210)  (0.210)  (0.209)  (0.210) 
Change in  PPE / Assets, squared  -0.157  -0.244  -0.253  -0.279 
 (1.579)  (1.690)  (1.587)  (1.694) 
Change in Idiosyncratic Vol. (from t-2 to t-1)  0.357  0.642  0.370  0.680 
 (0.816)  (0.849)  (0.818)  (0.849) 
Change in  Free cash flow (from t-2 to t-1)   -0.120  0.032  -0.120  0.030 
 (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.107)  (0.108) 
Change in  R&D / Assets (from t-2 to t-1)  -0.444  -0.605  -0.446  -0.603 
 (0.386)  (0.404)  (0.387)  (0.404) 
No R&D dummy (from t-2 to t-1)  0.025  0.029  0.022  0.025 
 (0.082)  (0.080)  (0.081)  (0.078) 
Change in  CapEx / Assets (from t-2 to t-1)  -0.584***  -0.193  -0.589***  -0.191 
 (0.181)  (0.180)  (0.180)  (0.180) 
Change in Turnover NYSE (from t-2 to t-1)    -0.091***    -0.093*** 
   (0.033)    (0.033) 
Change in Turnover NASD (from t-2 to t-1)     -0.113***    -0.115*** 
   (0.019)    (0.019) 
Return (from t-2 to t-1)     -0.101***    -0.100*** 
   (0.021)    (0.021) 
Return (from t-3 to t-2)     -0.101***    -0.102*** 
   (0.015)    (0.015) 
Observations 21389  20403  21389  20403 
Number of clusters  4744  4515  4744  4515 
R-squared 0.10  0.12  0.10  0.12   45
Table 9: Changes in Tobin’s Q and changes in shares held and total shares 
outstanding by ownership quintile 
 
The table reports coefficients from firm-fixed effects regressions of changes in q on lagged ownership changes and 
changes in other control variables by ownership quintile. The large change of at least 2.5% in director and officer 
ownership is decomposed into changes caused by an increase or decrease in shares held by directors and officers, and 
changes caused by an increase or decrease in shares outstanding. The decomposition is done as in Helwege, Pirinsky, 
and Stulz (2007). Columns 1 through 5 include indicator variables that are equal to one if there was a large change in 
the numerator or denominator of inside ownership, and zero otherwise The dependent variable is the change from year 
t-1 to year t of a proxy for Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, 
where the market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less 
the book value of common stock and deferred taxes. The other independent variables are the same as in table 8, column 
2. The regressions include year-fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering 
at the firm level. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.  
 
  quint 1  quint 2  quint 3  quint 4  quint 5 
Large decrease in shares held (t-1)  -0.041  -0.012  0.108  -0.004  -0.011 
 (0.112)  (0.094)  (0.080)  (0.062)  (0.059) 
Large increase in shares outstanding (t-1)  0.014  -0.368**  0.006  -0.167*  -0.185** 
 (0.345)  (0.186)  (0.118)  (0.097)  (0.093) 
Large increase shares held (t-1)  -0.113  0.085  0.096  0.074  -0.029 
 (0.220)  (0.113)  (0.074)  (0.061)  (0.048) 
Large decrease in shares outstanding (t-1)  -0.295  1.242  -0.058  0.109  0.038 
 (0.361)  (0.757)  (0.132)  (0.108)  (0.069) 
Change in Log (Book value)   -0.293  -0.786*** -0.547**  -0.384*** -0.272** 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.189)  (0.201)  (0.269)  (0.131)  (0.123) 
Change in Log (Book value)   0.334  0.400**  0.139  0.121  0.212 
 squared  (0.281)  (0.161)  (0.300)  (0.135)  (0.140) 
Change in  PPE / Assets   -0.532  -1.518*  -0.603  0.308  0.048 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.449)  (0.827)  (0.573)  (0.580)  (0.366) 
Change in  PPE / Assets  -2.991  4.032  0.724  -1.186  -1.596 
 squared  (3.285)  (9.095)  (2.200)  (2.704)  (2.412) 
Change in Idiosyncratic Vol.   0.360  -1.395  5.806**  0.034  0.552 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (3.235)  (3.191)  (2.670)  (1.916)  (1.288) 
Change in  Free cash flow   0.020  0.252  -0.163  -0.119  0.038 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.325)  (0.314)  (0.259)  (0.262)  (0.209) 
Change in  R&D / Assets   0.817  0.459  -1.859*  -1.250  0.583 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.918)  (0.730)  (1.127)  (1.072)  (1.611) 
No R&D dummy   0.011  0.194  0.034  0.076  -0.091 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.157)  (0.212)  (0.287)  (0.168)  (0.149) 
Change in  CapEx / Assets   -0.220  0.230  -0.686  -0.538  -0.097 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.535)  (0.601)  (0.526)  (0.403)  (0.275) 
Change in Turnover NYSE   -0.124**  -0.036  -0.128*  -0.008  -0.070 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.054)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.170)  (0.119) 
Change in Turnover NASD  -0.171***  -0.069 -0.110**  -0.134***  -0.102 
  (from t-2 to t-1)  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.072) 
Return (from t-2 to t-1)   -0.210***  -0.150**  -0.123***  -0.070  -0.050 
 (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.045)  (0.059)  (0.048) 
Return (from t-3 to t-2)   -0.116**  -0.148***  -0.097***  -0.094***  -0.081*** 
 (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.031) 
Observations  4374 4186 4057 3982 3804 
Number of clusters  1098  1498 1548 1497 1285 
R-squared  0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.10   46
Table 10: Changes in Tobin’s Q and concurrent changes in ownership  
 
The table reports coefficients from firm-fixed effects regressions of changes in q on concurrent ownership changes and 
concurrent changes in other control variables. The dependent variable is the change from year t-1 to year t of a proxy 
for Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value is 
calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common 
stock and deferred taxes; capital expenditures over assets. The first column includes indicator variables for large 
increases and decreases in director and officer ownership. The second and third columns decompose the large change in 
director and officer ownership into changes caused by a large increase or decrease in shares held by directors and 
officers, and changes caused by a large increase or decrease in shares outstanding. The decomposition is done as in 
Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007). Column 2 includes an indicator variable equal to one if the respective condition is 
met, and zero otherwise. Column 3 includes the magnitude of the change in the numerator or denominator, conditional 
on a large change occurring. The other independent variables are: the logarithm of book-value-of-assets; property, 
plant, and equipment over total assets; idiosyncratic volatility estimated from a market model and based on daily 
returns; free cash flow, defined as EBITDA over sales; research and development expenditures over assets; a No R&D 
dummy, equal to 1 if the firm has missing research and development expenditures for that year; capital expenditures 
over assets; annualized average daily NYSE turnover if traded on NYSE, and zero, otherwise; annualized average daily 
NASDAQ turnover if traded on NASDAQ, and zero, otherwise; and lagged firm returns from year t-2 to t-1. All 
accounting variables represented changes from year t-1 to year t. The regressions include year-fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. (***), (**), and (*) indicate 
statistical significance of the underlying coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Large increase in ownership (t)  0.047*     
 (0.027)     
Large decrease in ownership (t)  0.163***     
 (0.027)     
Large decrease shares held (t)    -0.009  -0.508** 
   (0.028)  (0.214) 
Large increase in shares outstanding (t)    0.457***  2.345*** 
   (0.050)  (0.302) 
Large increase in shares held (t)    0.071**  0.392 
   (0.031)  (0.238) 
Large decrease in shares outstanding (t)    -0.087**  0.594 
   (0.042)  (0.370) 
Change in Log (Book value (from t-1 to t))  -0.696***  -0.746***  -0.719*** 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) 
Change in Log (Book value squared  -0.210**  -0.221***  -0.256*** 
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.079) 
Change in  PPE / Assets (from t-1 to t)  -1.125***  -1.126***  -1.136*** 
  (0.204) (0.203) (0.203) 
Change in  PPE / Assets, squared  -0.486  -0.632  -0.467 
  (1.295) (1.273) (1.282) 
Change in Idiosyncratic Vol. (from t-1 to t)  -10.352***  -10.293***  -10.420*** 
  (0.928) (0.925) (0.924) 
Change in  Free cash flow (from t-1 to t)   0.672***  0.668***  0.674*** 
  (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) 
Change in  R&D / Assets (from t-1 to t)  0.818**  0.748**  0.758** 
  (0.363) (0.358) (0.361) 
No R&D dummy (from t-1 to t)  -0.121  -0.114  -0.106 
  (0.086) (0.084) (0.087) 
Change in  CapEx / Assets (from t-1 to t)  0.696***  0.703***  0.699*** 
  (0.205) (0.203) (0.203) 
Change in Turnover NYSE (from t-1 to t)  0.282***  0.270***  0.276*** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Change in Turnover NASD (from t-1 to t)   0.259***  0.250***  0.253*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
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Return (from t-2 to t-1)  -0.106***  -0.110***  -0.107*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations  20453 20453 20453 
Number  of  clusters  4518 4518 4518 
R-squared  0.15 0.16 0.16 
 
 
 